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Abstract
Livestock raiding has been a source of conflict amongst and between pastoral 
societies in Africa for hundreds of years. However, more recently, these raids 
have become more violent and have triggered much more organised retaliations. 
Many times raids themselves are perceived as motivated by ethnic dimensions. 
The following paper looks at tensions and conflict between Turkana and Pokot 
communities in rural Kenya. The paper first traces the historical context of cattle 
rustling and livestock raiding between pastoral communities within Kenya. 
It then identifies contemporary factors driving exacerbated tensions: access to 
resources, profiteering, and weapons proliferation. The paper further explores 
the systemic nature of the conflict through analysing livestock raiding as a 
conflict spiral dictated by negative reciprocal actions. The spiral is ultimately 
maintained due to mimetic violence structures that are in place. It then offers 
prescriptions and potential solutions to the conflict, which are centred on 
transcending the relationship from mimetic violence to mimetic peace and 
reconciliation. Ultimately, by empowering local pastoral communities in the 
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form of multi-ethnic coalitions, and promoting broad-based interest groups, 
cultural transcendence can reverse the conflict spiral into a relationship of 
mutual reciprocity and mimetic peace.
Introduction
While the terms ‘cattle rustling’ or ‘livestock raiding’ may conjure up images of a 
grand, romanticised period of American history and the Wild West, today these 
terms have a much more imminent, destructive, and abhorrent connotation to 
pastoralist societies within Kenya. The practice of cattle rustling has been a part 
of pastoralist society in Kenya for generations; however, in recent years, livestock 
theft has become increasingly violent and infused with more dangerous weapons 
(Kenya Human Rights Commission 2010:7). Perhaps the biggest testimony 
to the escalating violence of livestock conflict is the event which occurred in 
Suguta Valley, Samburu District, in November 2012, when forty-two Kenyan 
police officers were killed in conflict with suspected rustlers (Greiner 2013:216). 
In such a turbulent region, where small, internal conflicts can quickly expand to 
state and regional strife, it is important to understand the history, context, and 
driving causes behind pastoralist clashes.
This paper explores the context of pastoralist clashes in Kenya by focusing on the 
situation between two ethnic groups which are oftentimes involved in violent 
conflict with one another along their respective land borders: the Turkana and 
Pokot peoples. The rest of this piece is divided into three main sections. The first 
explores the historical context of livestock raiding within Kenya, spanning from 
pre-colonialism and continuing through independence. The second section 
analyses developments as well as previous attempts at peacemaking. Finally, 
by identifying several issues of contention between the parties, I offer several 
potential solutions which could alleviate the situation, manage ongoing conflict, 
and ultimately restore peace to these communities and rural Kenya as a whole.
Historical evolution: From rungus to AK-47s
Pastoralist communities in East Africa have traditionally been built upon 
nomadic peoples, migrating along with their respective herds in search of 
lands to graze. Pastoralist communities are often credited with the increased 
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movement of people southward throughout African history (Iliffe 1995:16). 
It is noted that on many occasions, pastoral warfare and cattle rustling served 
mainly as a tool for resource and land expansion by these societies. There were 
often institutions in place to curb widespread violence. Typical weapons were 
rungus, wooden clubs commonly found in East Africa, and bows. There were 
also laws of conflict declared by clan and community elders which prohibited 
phenomena such as violence against women and children, and contained peace 
mechanisms. During early periods, these conflicts were often seen as a form of 
redistribution and balancing of wealth between communities, in which one 
community would take cattle from another when they were short on livestock, 
and vice-versa; it was reciprocal in nature (PRAGYA n.d.).
Following independence, pastoralist communities in Kenya saw increasingly 
violent conflict with one another, and the spread of modern weapon technology 
contributed to more deadly conflicts. Many African scholars pinpoint as a cause 
of these recurring conflicts the fact that colonial administrators were pushing 
these ethnic communities out of their historical homelands to make room for 
farmland (Murunga and Nasong’o 2007; Kanyinga 2009). These communities 
now found themselves clamouring for new territories in strange lands, where 
they were often at odds with the previous inhabitants. Notably, the Turkana and 
Pokot communities adapted to these colonial policies by adopting ‘transhumance 
forms of pastoralism’ in which they generally abandoned a nomadic lifestyle for 
themselves, but maintained nomadic herding of cattle (Kenya Human Rights 
Commission 2010:11). This adaptation shifted the battlegrounds from the 
communities themselves to the grasslands on which the cattle were grazed; the 
rustling of livestock thus increased.
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a trend of democratisation sweep across 
the African continent. A change occurred in the nature of East African cattle 
rustling – the raids became commercialised. Previously, stolen livestock had 
been utilised for bride wealth or redistribution of herds; however, beginning in 
this era, livestock raiding became incentivised for monetary gain and organised 
crime syndicates arose (Greiner 2013:220). Similarly, during this period, 
clashes between communities became increasingly politicised. The democratic 
movement that had swept across much of Africa had caused a response by the 
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party-in-power at the time to turn to Majimboism, a form of federal regionalism 
which disguised ethnic mobilisation and party support under territorial claims 
(Greiner 2013:221–222). The previously localised raids and clashes were now 
often seen as blossoming into full-scale ethnic conflicts. A conflict spiral of 
cattle rustling became embedded in which one ethnic group would respond to 
another’s raids with their own, in an endless conflict spiral.
Contextualising the conflict 
The parties involved
The Turkana people number roughly 800 000 within Kenya, occupying about 
twenty-four territorial sections. They constitute around 2 percent of the entire 
population (African Studies Center n.d.). Being pastoralists, their primary 
commodities are livestock, including cattle, goats, camels, and sheep. They 
thus rely heavily on following the rains and tend to migrate around temporary 
camps or villages within a somewhat fixed area. It is important to note that 
oftentimes the herdsmen also migrate to other territories with permission 
of the Turkana hosts concerned. Age is a key factor in the organisational 
structure of Turkana society, and commonly there is a generational structure 
of leadership, with elders taking the helm in mediating disputes and directing 
trade defence. Authority is generally decentralised, and while there are clan 
leaders, small communities generally decide collectively on actions to take. 
For defence purposes, enforcement is generally granted to village warriors and 
their age-mates (Mathew and Boyd 2014:59). It is important to note that although 
there has historically been a warrior sect of Turkana society, increasingly this 
role has become voluntary for purposes of raiding, and is generally a large-scale 
community effort.
The Pokot community is organised in similar fashion to the Turkana. Pokot 
society is based on patrilineal heritage and is organised around a clan entity 
living in a village-style setting. They are pastoralists similar to the Turkana 
community, and thus rely heavily on livestock and migratory patterns. Again, age 
is an important organisational structure and a generational top-down approach 
is manifested in many aspects. However, scholars such as Michael Bollig 
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(2000) note the evolution of lineage in economic matters. Issues such as trade 
(including livestock) have deviated from this organisational structure and are 
now characterised as decentralised, and more individualised—an outcropping 
of a free market society. No one individual seems to dominate authority, and 
actors are generally free to decide their own affairs (Bollig 2000:358–359). This 
trend seems to parallel what is seen within the Turkana community.
Multi-dimensional factors of conflict: Profiteering, resources, and 
small arms
Recently, scholars and other external actors have begun to identify access to 
resources as a legitimate issue of dispute between the two communities and 
pastoral societies as a whole (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2010; Cheserek 
et al. 2012; Boone 2013; Gleditsch 2013). The region in which the Turkana and 
the Pokot reside is semi-arid, receiving little overall rainfall. Thus, the groups 
must jostle for access to limited watering holes that are available to graze their 
cattle. Quantitative analysis actually suggests that violent raids increase during 
rainy seasons, as actors compete over newly discovered aquifers. Data over time 
indicate that the frequency of raids and their level of violence increase with 
rainy seasons and recede with drought-like conditions (Witsenburg and Adano 
2009:520). These results support the notion that pastoralist communities find 
themselves in disputes over limited availability of resources with which to graze 
their cattle and support their own well-being. Perhaps even more alarming is 
the discovery of oil deposits in the Turkana region close to the border of the 
Pokot community. Both regions laid claim to the deposits, and another point of 
conflict about access to limited resources is therefore identifying itself (PRAGYA 
n.d.:30). Oil could prove profitable to the community which takes advantage 
of land-leasing arrangements, and thus there is a lot at stake for both Turkana 
and Pokot.
A significant issue which has led to further deterioration of stability within the 
pastoralist region has been the influx of modern weaponry. Most of the illegal 
weaponry originates from border areas of Uganda, Ethiopia, and Somalia. It then 
reaches these pastoralist communities often through criminal gangs, and this 
further fuels the regional violence (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2010:26). 
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Thus, cattle rustling becomes profitable for these illegal arms traders, and leads 
to an extension of conflict throughout the region. The interconnected nature of 
Turkana-Pokot conflict can clearly be exhibited with the nature of profiteering 
through illegal weapons. As the conflict has evolved over time from small-scale 
conflicts fought with basic clubs and bows and arrows to more retaliatory, full-
scale assaults undertaken with advanced small arms, the conflict spiral has 
become more and more evident between these communities. If a herdsman 
purchases illegal arms to protect his livestock, opposing factions will do the same, 
fearing his actions are aggressive in nature. I find striking similarities between 
the build-up of arms of pastoralist communities and the nature of Soviet-US 
relations in the past. The main difference is that these actions lead to physical 
violence between pastoralist communities, thus a ‘hot’ war.
The underlying issue of reciprocity: Mimetic violence
Though factors driving pastoral conflict within Kenya have long been identified, 
sustainable peacemaking has been absent, and continues to appear distant from 
the contemporary situation. I argue that the main impediment to peacemaking is 
the notion of reciprocity, in this case negative reciprocity. There remains within 
the conflict an embedded situation of negative responses to negative actions. 
Each response builds upon the last, and a conflict spiral erupts. What began 
simply as a cultural raiding practice has blossomed into increased armament, 
contestation over resources, and ultimately violence itself.
Historically, pastoral communities within East Africa operated on communal 
grazing lands rather peacefully. Because grazing lands could only be used for 
several months of the year, arrangements on land sharing had to be made between 
nomadic peoples and other communities. Reciprocal institutional arrangements 
were born in which some communities allowed grazing on their lands during 
certain periods in return for grazing rights in neighbouring regions (Ngaido 
2005:[1]). In fact, reciprocity was the key mechanism which enabled collective 
action in traditional societies. However, with the onset of colonial land policies 
and the encroachment on pastoral grazing lands by administrative policies, 
reciprocity was interrupted. There could no longer be an internal guarantee 
of reciprocity. Similarly, cattle were previously a cornerstone of reciprocal 
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relationships in pastoral societies. Cattle would be traded for bridewealth, which 
would strengthen kinship and communal bonds because of future interactions; 
however, the commercialisation of livestock has eroded potential reciprocal 
arrangements involving cattle. Cattle raided for markets cannot be entered back 
into a reciprocal market (Krätli and Swift 1999:9).
The conflict situation in pastoral Kenya today revolves around the notion 
of negative reciprocity. Turkana and Pokot societies respond negatively to 
one another’s actions – violence begets violence. Cattle were indeed raided 
throughout the history of East African pastoral societies. However, these 
raids were more of a form of wealth redistribution through cattle. There were 
customary rules in which cattle raids were limited to times of need, were small 
in number, and generally characterised by little violence. However, as rules 
began to be increasingly violated during the 20th century, these raids escalated 
in intensity (Krätli and Swift 1999). Victims responded with raids of increased 
intensity, and the conflict spiral was born. Krätli and Swift (1999:21–22) note:
Ultimately, escalation is prompted by one group’s perception that the 
raiding practices of the other group have become ‘excessive’, a fuzzy 
and subjective notion which may change according to a number of 
variables….Inter-tribal co-operation ceases and daily social life and 
economic routines are disrupted. Such escalation can be interrupted 
only when both parties feel that the balance of power has been 
re-established, that is when the peace process is not seen as a sign of 
weakness of one of the parties…
Clearly, group perception has been co-opted by the effects of livestock raiding. 
Each group perceives the other’s actions as increasingly hostile and as aimed at 
cultural and social targets rather than commercial livestock targets alone. What 
is essentially a financial conflict erupts into full-scale ethnic war. The contention 
between Turkana and Pokot communities goes beyond a simple conflict spiral. 
According to the Structural Change Model (Pruitt et al. 2003), any refraining 
from an escalated response is generally perceived as weakness, and groups fear 




In this model, the emphasis is on the transformative effect that the actions of 
one party have on another within a conflict. Of particular emphasis in this 
case are the psychological and group change effects that the Structural Change 
Model elicits within its application. The Model notes four emotions specific 
to psychological changes: blame, anger, fear, and image threats. While these 
emotions can indeed cause a condition to deteriorate, they are not permanent 
structures. Rather, these emotions are temporary and only exist so long as the 
Model is applicable and present. These emotions often have a negative effect on 
groups by reducing caution, diminishing empathy, creating the perception that 
relations are a zero-sum game, and ultimately making it easier to scapegoat the 
other through reduced communication and negative perceptions. 
Both studied communities have indeed undergone psychological changes. 
Blame and anger are typical community mobilisers for an aggressive response. 
Each community tends to become polarised around emotional responses to 
livestock raiding, which they see as a direct attack on their economic well-
being, their security, and ultimately their community. However, fear is also 
an emotional factor driving conflict escalation. When raiding communities 
increase their armaments, nearby communities respond with a reciprocal 
increase in the capacity of their own weapons. This act of defence is seen by 
the initial party as an act of aggression, and thus a security dilemma is born. 
Finally, hostile perceptions of the other continue to erode the situation in rural 
Kenya. Each community identifies the actions of the other as stemming from 
some innate, negative identity trait of that party. These perceptions are what 
shifted the conflict from individual levels to communal levels. One act of greed 
by a raider or group of raiders becomes equated to communal aggression. 
The victims respond by coalescing their own community members around the 
notion of ethnic identity. The situation is reciprocated continuously with each 
instance of livestock raiding.
While previous scholars tended to identify the factors contributing to pastoral 
conflict as related to profiteering, access to resources, and small arms proliferation, 
I state instead that these are symptoms of a much larger Structural Change 
Model of conflict. This situation within the conflict has essentially embedded 
negative reciprocity as a norm. Communal actions are gauged by exogenous 
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factors rather than internal decisions. These actions have consequences of their 
own which contribute to similar effects on the receiving end. One community’s 
hostile actions are mimicked on the receiving end, in a never-ending cycle.
Within situations of these communal patterns of violence, in which negative 
reciprocity changes the structure of beliefs and perceptions of the others, the 
situation can, and must, be further defined. René Girard delves into the topic 
of violence throughout humankind. He notes that what was once unanimous 
violence (erupting for a cause of desire which spent itself) can, over time, lead 
to the same desire of the victim group. Thus, rather than a desire as the root 
cause of conflict and competition, the cause becomes the violence itself, which 
paradoxically, is not a rational desire (Girard and Gregory 2005:160-162). 
In this instance, I will implement the term mimetic violence as it fits the mould of 
Girard’s theory. While cattle rustling between communities originally occurred 
out of wants and desires to simply increase resources through illicit means, the 
reciprocal actions have continued to transform. Armed responses to incursions 
are no longer driven for a reciprocal desire for cattle, but rather for a mimetic 
desire of ‘violence begetting violence’. Any actions of the other groups in these 
cases are viewed with a biased lens that is often influenced by the notion of 
mimetic violence. Understanding the nature of mimetic violence is vital in order 
to implement prescriptions; however, so too are understanding past attempts at 
mediation to identify what factors, if any, can be applied within the framework 
of the Structural Change Model relating to mimetic violence.
Past attempts at peacemaking
Previous peacemaking efforts have been concentrated on the surface factors 
driving the conflict between Turkana and Pokot communities, which I argue 
are actually symptoms of a much more systemic conflict model. One attempt 
at peacemaking focused on the communities themselves. The focus was placed 
within pastoral communities to forbid raided livestock from being retained by 
the actors conducting the raid. Furthermore, women stolen during raids could 
not be taken on as brides of the raiders (Krätli and Swift 1999:32). On one hand, 
the approach was successful in that it was effective in removing the raiders from 
physical ownership incentives of raiding. The grassroots approach provided 
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local agency in which cattle rustlers were much more likely to obey their own 
group’s instructions than to endure exogenously imposed sanctions. On the 
other hand, however, the project led to unforeseen consequences. Raided cattle 
were allowed to be given to elders or sold for weapons. Essentially, what occurred 
was the militarisation of raiding in which village elders became patrons of raids; 
they would support large-scale assaults for benefits. Furthermore, raiders sold 
cattle that were raided on the market and purchased weapons for themselves 
to conduct future raids. Thus, I argue that because the effort failed to remedy 
the systemic nature of cattle rustling, alleviating one factor of conflict shifted 
resources to others. 
Another peacemaking effort aimed specifically at community solutions to 
Turkana conflicts enjoyed some successes. However again, Grahn and Akabwai 
(2005:21-22) note that communal solutions are not effective at solving systemic 
problems within a conflict.
Peacemaking efforts at the macro-level have encountered problems as well. 
One author explains that state-led peacemaking initiatives often fail due to 
corruption, lack of legitimacy, low resources, and ultimately institutional 
weakness. In a government in which ethnic politics are deeply embedded, attempts 
at mediating ethnic conflict disputes tend to exacerbate social tensions (Mahmoud 
2011:159-161). Groups see government action as a continuation of ethnic biases 
and thus respond to mediation attempts in the same way as they do livestock raids 
– by polarising defence along their own communal identity.
Attempts at reducing access to small arms have often similarly failed in the 
past. Kenya itself has a regionally strong stance against small arms proliferation. 
These weapons are largely outlawed within the state. However, the local 
incentive to maintain weapons trade exists due to pastoral conflict. Thus, 
weapons are purchased from neighbouring states with more lenient weapons 
policies. The Regional Centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) has 
already sponsored the destruction of over 100 000 small weapons (Lamb and 
Dye 2009:79). The effectiveness of such projects is often questioned, however. 
High costs of undertaking such large efforts mean that the destruction of 
weapons themselves is often dependent upon external sources of funding. In 
this situation, the government is not a stakeholder and thus has little incentive 
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to partake. Scholars note the continuing spiral of an influx of illicit arms and the 
ensuing destruction (Lamb and Dye 2009; UN Office for Disarmament Affairs 
2011; Mkutu 2008).
Previous attempts have all fallen short on their mandate to instil sustainable 
peacemaking efforts. I argue that these attempts have failed due to the fact that 
they focus on symptoms of negative reciprocity rather than trying to interrupt 
the conflict spiral. Similarly, initiatives have often focused only on one track of 
diplomacy, such as the local or state level. By narrowing the scope to one track, 
the negative pull of the conflict model simply gains traction in other areas which 
are not being focused upon. These past attempts seem to point to the need to 
instil both multi-track diplomacy initiatives as well as some sort of peacemaking 
which involves reducing negative reciprocity.
Integrative solutions and mimetic blessing
Pruitt et al. (2003) offer several types of integrative solutions, two of which I 
find are directly applicable to the conflict situation between Turkana and Pokot 
communities. Pastoral conflict in Kenya indeed maintains conflict symptoms 
due to access to resources. One posited solution is ‘expanding the pie’ (Pruitt 
et al. 2003:194). In this scenario, the total access to resources to both parties is 
increased. If access to a consistent water supply, grazing lands, or oil revenues 
were increased, contention over resources would diminish as a conflict driver. 
I thus posit that there must be local capacity-building efforts to improve 
local infrastructure as well as reach revenue-sharing agreements between the 
governments over newly discovered oil sources. These revenues must be shared 
not only with the government of Kenya, but between pastoral communities 
themselves. By implementing these reciprocal institutional arrangements, 
mimetic blessings can return to govern pastoral society as was previously the 
norm before colonisation.
While the recognition of communal land rights in the 2010 Constitution of 
Kenya was a step in the right direction, there is yet to be seen any legal respect 
for practical reciprocity. Past colonial and early independence allocations 
of land cannot be undone. However, both the government and pastoralist 
communities themselves must evolve in order to balance communal access to 
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resources with respect to physical land boundaries and revenue points. I suggest 
that communal lands and pastoral grazing spots must be officially demarcated 
by the government in order to form a quantifiable and measurable regional 
territory. Communal grazing lands would enable the continuation of a pastoral 
lifestyle while reducing issues of contention along cross-border raids and cattle 
rustling. Thus, any instances of livestock raiding would no longer be viewed as 
an ethnic, group-based conflict, but rather as an individual property violation. 
Judicial courts would be more able to provide effective remedies and arbitration. 
These remedies would similarly apply to disputes over resources. Claims to 
access could successfully be justified through the judicial system. I also argue 
that arbitration should entertain the idea of implementing profit sharing 
of resources between the communities in dispute. The exact share would be 
determined through legal procedures.
As Wily (2011:752-753) criticises, legal mechanisms are useless when they are not 
enforced in practice. Turkana and Pokot communities themselves must force the 
hand of the government in recognising legal access to communal lands. I posit 
that in order to successfully push for rule of law, these communities themselves 
must coalesce around unions based on non-sociological variables. For instance, 
Turkana and Pokot businessmen could form a coalition or interest group around 
cattle herding, agricultural trade, or any number of relevant markets. These 
unions have the added benefit of requiring levels of reconciliation and mimetic 
blessings in order for individuals to effectively engage with one another across 
social boundaries. As has been evidenced countless times in democratic, market-
based economies – money talks. While elites may be able to ignore pressure from 
broad ethnic communities with varying interests – communities in conflict with 
one another – they cannot ignore the influence of a concentrated lobbying group 
with a significant amount of market share. Just as Kameri-Mbote (2013:2) notes 
the need to provide local communities with tools to manage a legal framework, 
I argue a bottom-up approach of dissemination of legal information and 
advocacy could provide local agency. NGOs could prove paramount in providing 
agency as well as facilitating the cessation of mimetic violence through mutual 
blessings and increased interconnectedness.
Paired with this solution is that of ‘cost cutting’. Here, parties concede on 
issues when costs in doing so are reduced, often due to compensation (Pruitt 
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et al. 2003:197). I argue that Turkana and Pokot members can agree to install 
mutual land-sharing arrangements during set periods in return for more 
internal enforcement against cattle raiding. Though land sharing may incur 
costs for original communities grazing herds at these locations, overall costs 
are reduced because internal sanctions decrease cattle raiding, and thus costs 
to defend against raids lower the cost of grazing in general. One study found 
that in pastoral societies, internal sanctioning against raid violators is essentially 
a public good. When sanctions and enforcement are initiated from within a 
community, societal costs of ‘shirking’ on norms are increased (Mathew and 
Boyd 2014:61-64).  Cattle raiders not only face economic costs but social costs 
such as loss of bridewealth and communal respect. Thus, internal sanctions are 
a notion which I argue should be implemented in order to increase the cost of 
livestock raiding and reduce the cost of positive reciprocity.
At a macro-level, the proliferation of illicit small arms in Kenya is both a 
product of porous borders and of market incentives. While at first the task may 
seem monumental, reducing the costs of arms regulation is indeed achievable 
through both communal and state cooperation. I first conclude that Kenyan law 
enforcement can no longer be absent from the region. The police must increase 
their presence within rural pastoral grazing lands as well as along the borders 
between neighbouring states, especially Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda. 
While allocating funding to this mammoth task may initially seem daunting, 
evidence indicates that indeed it is actually less costly in the long-run to harden 
borders and increase the costs of illegal arms trade than continuously destroying 
armaments and dealing with the aftermath of deadly pastoral rivalries (Mkutu 
2008). Along with a physical police presence, I contend for a strict training 
regimen for border officers in order to ensure that the rule of law and respect for 
individual rights are respected.
The least costly means of addressing illegal arms proliferation within pastoral 
communities of Kenya is simply to dis-incentivise the trade altogether. The fact 
that Kenya’s strict weapons policy is so unusual in the region creates market 
mechanisms in which illegal arms are smuggled into the nation. High demand 
drives high prices, and smugglers are more willing to risk their livelihoods 
to transport and propagate arms. Here, I propose regional integration and 
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participation in small arms limitations. Kenya’s policy towards arms sets a 
precedent for neighbouring states. However, unless these nations adopt similar 
policies, arms trade will only increase the more Kenya solidifies its position. East 
Africa must harmonise a policy framework aimed at reducing illegal small arms. 
The African Union and East African Community, I argue, could provide viable 
forums from which to launch these initiatives. A uniform regional approach to 
dissuading illicit arms trade is necessary in order to effectively diminish market 
incentives for trade to begin with. The local effects would be a decrease in 
violent conflicts between pastoral communities. Even if all other factors remain 
constant, conflict between Turkana and Pokot societies will be less organised, 
more slow to develop, and ultimately less deadly.
For both internal sanctioning and external arms agreements to be effective, 
overarching cooperation must be facilitated at first through ushering in a 
norm of mutual reciprocity. A local community’s decision to sanction cattle 
rustlers internally is only legitimate if that community expects neighbouring 
communities to do the same. The historical lack of authority and accountability 
of the Kenyan government within pastoral regions has infused a sense of 
impunity to livestock raiders. By simply increasing the presence of authority 
within rural communities, the government can signal a reversal in trends, 
garnering legitimacy in the perceptions of locals and commencing a new trend 
of mutual reciprocity in that the government will protect livestock in return 
for local communities also dis-incentivising raiding. Again, this relationship is 
mutually beneficial – costs are reduced at both a communal level and the state 
level. Finally, for regional cost-reduction of arms control to occur, states must 
signal to one another the legitimate intentions of their stance on weapons trade. 
Kenya’s difficulty has arisen because illegal weapons trade is more profitable 
due to the vacuum created. There is no system of reciprocity in the region, and 
neighbouring states have done little to harmonise arms control. It seems as if 
mutual relationships must be built from the communal level so as to bypass 
governments and instil a cross-border relationship. By bridging gaps locally, 
these communities can influence domestic policies to fall in line with the 
aspirations of regional communities as a whole. Cooperation must stem from 
community-based cooperation, reconciliation, and ultimately a cultural shift 
away from past mimetic violence.
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Many anthropologists and sociologists note the difficulties present when local 
communities undergo cultural shifts (Lee 2004; Bobo 1988; Moreland and Levine 
1982)). Oftentimes, a schism erupts between younger and older generations. 
Intra-group conflict can occur, especially when pressures of cultural norm shifts 
are exogenous. The external pressure of these norms is felt within the pastoralist 
communities themselves. With such a powerful external force, a solution must 
come from within.
Girard himself illustrates mimesis with a pessimistic view. For him, mimetic 
violence exists as a long-term response to the natural desires which contribute 
to unanimous violence. I find a fault with the fact that a natural response can 
lead to the paradox of these desires being replaced simply with the desire of 
violence or vengeance. I thus offer that indeed there exists an ability to transcend 
the conflict and implement mimetic blessing. Imitation of violence drives the 
conflict spiral to reach this mimetic pinnacle, but if instead of violence, actors 
imitated and reciprocated rational behaviour and good intentions, the cycle 
can indeed be broken. Furthermore, when mimesis of rationality replaces 
mimesis of violence, conflict itself is no longer a desire of communities. It is 
thus less likely that isolated violent behaviour would be perceived as an attack 
of identity. I therefore draw emphasis on this possibility, and focus on the actual 
transcendence of mimetic violence and the shift to mimetic blessing.
How could the transformation of mimetic violence to mimetic blessings be 
facilitated in the context of pastoral communities who have such a long and 
contentious history? Elizabeth Cole notes that history education and a pedagogy 
that takes history seriously are vital in order to promote progressive learning of 
the past. She explains:
What is critical here is not only the effect that these approaches to history 
can have on the formation of actively engaged, critically thinking citizens, 
but what they can offer to post-conflict settings where the history of the 
recent conflict is simply too sensitive and politically difficult to discuss 
openly… (Cole 2012:237).
Cole and others offer education as a way to bridge a gap from the past to 
current generations and to successfully construct progressive and mutual 
reciprocity between contentious groups. Education regarding cultural history 
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can tread lightly where the government and official mediation cannot. Bekerman 
and Zembylas (2014:57) note that in conflict settings, teachers must move away 
from the epistemological setting induced by the state and into a more critical, 
ontological perspective. The state and nationhood, they argue, pre-determine the 
identity of instruction teachers take. Grassroots approaches successfully enshrine 
shifting critical assessments to peace education, and can enable education to shift 
away from an identity created by the state (Lahai and Ware 2013).
While Cole explained that educational approaches and history teachings are 
vital to reconciling and transcending conflicts between communities, I wish to 
take her recommendations one step further. In a developing multi-ethnic nation 
such as Kenya, which lacks funding for educational reform and overhauls, and 
also has a history of a politically polarising ethnic force, attempting to implement 
a new practice could prove ineffective or even disastrous. An education policy 
focusing on negative emotions and ‘ethnic tragedies’ could prove destructive 
to the tensions between Pokot and Turkana communities. An ethnic-based 
education policy without proper institutions or plans in place can degrade 
already tense emotions between various groups. This ethnic pedagogy is deemed 
by scholars to have contributed to a large part of Balkanisation and ensuing 
violence in Assam, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka (Lange 2011).
There must be implementation of multi-track diplomacy in order to increase 
the capacity of the state to both enforce rule of law and increase local access 
to remedies. A multi-faceted coalition would ensure that dissemination of 
information and education policies are balanced. I suggest providing local 
NGOs with state-sponsored resources to disseminate information to local 
communities and elders. Still, the state has the largest potential for capacity to 
oversee access to resources and aid in curbing weapons proliferation. For this 
reason, the state is still a stakeholder and thus must serve a role in this coalition 
of reconciliation. Finally, I assert that these grassroots organisations should 
provide classroom instructors. Local schools could offer optional classes related 
to ethnic history which emphasise the connections and relationships shared by 
all pastoralist communities. Where the government fails to transcend ethnic 
boundaries in mediating conflict resolution, empowered local organisations can 
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combine with education in order to bridge social gaps and promote mediation, 
reconciliation, and ultimately a peaceful and respectful pastoral environment.
Can empowering local organisations in such a way actually alleviate systemic 
ethnic politicisation in Kenya? By conditioning the allocation of resources to 
multi-ethnic coalitions and NGOs which respect ethnic diversity, donors begin 
to set a bottom-up precedent of interest-based coalitions formed around ethnic 
unions and based upon participation rather than contention. The ultimate goal of 
conditioning aid to groups who promote these values is to create an environment 
in which multi-ethnic coalitions of unity, paired with interest-group participation 
in policy advocacy, become the norm. By institutionalising broad, cross-cultural 
relationships, mutual reciprocity is introduced into the system, which also has 
the effect of dis-incentivising violence. As Boehmke and Bowen (2010:667-668) 
note, interest-based advocacy correlates with an increase of democratic values. 
Bienen and Herbst (1996:27-28) also support this analysis regarding Africa and 
note a decrease in ethnic politics and rent-seeking. By providing agency to local 
organisations, not only can ethnic tensions between pastoral communities be 
reduced, but also the systemic ethnic politicisation in Kenya itself. The catalyst in 
this case is the transformative nature that local cooperation can have in promoting 
mutual reciprocity and ultimately mimetic blessings.
Reconciliation is vital to shifting the spiral among Turkana and Pokot 
communities from mimetic violence to mimetic blessings. Scholars such as 
Vamik Volkan (1998) argue that by reconciling differences between parties, all 
the results of the violence cannot be undone, and that the situation cannot be 
exactly the same as it was before the violence. Vern Redekop (2011), however, 
asserts that pairing spiritual reconciliation with focusing on personal connections 
may contribute to emergent creativity, which can indeed transform previous 
relationships among parties. Similarly, the multitrack peacemaking initiatives I 
posit, by pairing local and state-sponsored efforts, allow for the emergence of new 
principles in reconciliation. New norms emerge from multitrack approaches of 
reconciliation. Meta-requisites like implementing education to bridge cultural 
gaps as well as internal enforcement mechanisms of justice promote emergent 
creativity. The conflict spiral between the feuding pastoral communities is not 
only terminated, it is transformed into a spiral of mimetic blessings. With these 
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blessings in place, a positive peace can ultimately be reached, which can erode 
negative reciprocity and transform the situation into one of mutual reciprocity 
and blessings.
This analysis thus seeks to expand upon mimesis within the realm of conflict. 
I have attempted to steer discussions away from the notion of the ‘inevitability’ 
of mimetic violence within a conflict spiral, and rather to raise questions as 
to how these conflict situations can be changed into relationships of mimetic 
blessing. Mimetic violence with its reciprocal behaviour that occurs not so 
much for material desires or resources, but simply for the desire of vengeance 
itself, has to be counteracted. How can the desire of violence and vengeance be 
a rational response within any one society? Thus, this study aims to provide 
evidence for the fact that not only is mimetic blessing possible within society, 
but it can serve as a means to end conflict through a natural state of rationality. 
The dehumanisation that occurs due to mimetic violence, alongside the other 
psychological and group factors that drive pastoral conflict within Kenya, can 
indeed be reversed when the conflict environment is transformed.
Conclusions and a way forward
The factors driving the pastoral conflict between the Pokot and Turkana 
communities in Kenya are related to profiteering, small arms proliferation, 
and access to resources. I have illustrated that these conflict drivers are 
actually inherent symptoms of a much larger systemic nature to the conflict. 
Livestock raiding between these communities is based on an age-old custom of 
reciprocity. Whereas, long ago, reciprocity was a beneficial tool for maintaining 
resources through institutions, the onset of colonial policies diminished access 
to land and decreased incentives for land-sharing arrangements. The practice of 
livestock raiding was transformed from a reciprocal tool of wealth distribution 
to a reciprocal vice of profiteering. Negative reciprocity was officially embedded 
within the system and maintained through structural change in psychological 
tendencies and perceptions of the ‘other’. A conflict spiral and security dilemma 
developed in which raids dictated an escalated armed response along communal 
identities. The situation continues today and is cyclical in nature.
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The solution advanced within this article is to implement multitrack 
peacemaking efforts. Internal enforcement, cross-cultural cooperation, and 
increased state accountability can contribute to a positive peace. Simultaneously, 
cooperation is important at both a communal and a regional level. The 
geopolitics of state cooperation in East Africa cannot be discounted. In order 
for mutual relationships to occur, a bottom-up approach must evolve which 
is driven by eroding the cycle of negative reciprocity and replacing it with a 
transformative structure based upon healing, inclusiveness, learning from the 
past, and overall cultural openness.
Education can be implemented as a tool to instil a sense of reconciliation. This 
reconciliation itself, which may be brought forth by a coalition of grassroots as 
well as state organisations, may lead to the emergence of creativity. Transcendence 
between communities can occur as the result of new norms emerging which 
fundamentally alter the conflict and become irreversible. Ultimately, emergent 
creativity can transcend conflict norms and transform the situation from a conflict 
spiral of negative reciprocity to a positive peace building upon mimetic blessings. 
Increased cooperation between pastoral communities as well as increased state 
capacity will raise the welfare of all the parties involved. Emergent creativity 
paired with mutual reciprocity is paramount to constructing an environment 
of mimetic peace and ultimately spearheading peacemaking efforts between 
the Pokot and Turkana communities. With spiritual and cultural reconciliation, 
these communities can arm themselves not with defensive mechanisms against 
perceived aggression, but rather with tools of cohesion, understanding, and 
ultimately a sustainable peace.
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